In this paper, we develop a search-based model of asset trading. We assume that investors differ in their horizons, and can invest in two identical assets. The asset markets are partially segmented: investors can search in only one market, but can decide which one. We show that there exist a continuum of symmetric equilibria where investors are indifferent between the two markets, and a unique clientele equilibrium where short-horizon investors strictly prefer one market. This "liquid" market has higher volume and prices, and lower search times for buyers and sellers. The clientele equilibrium generally dominates the symmetric ones, i.e., the concentration of liquidity is socially desirable. In some cases, however, the clientele equilibrium is dominated, and in these cases the entry of buyers in the liquid market is below the socially optimal level.
Introduction
It has been well documented that the yields on just-issued bonds (on-the-run bonds) are significantly lower than those on seasoned bonds (off-the-run bonds) with very similar characteristics. Moreover, the trading volume of the on-the-run bonds is significantly higher than that of the off-the-run bonds. For example, the spread between the on-the-run treasury bonds and their off-the-run counterparts is about 55 basis points per annum (Warga (1992) ), while the trading volume of the on-the-run bonds is several times higher than that of their off-the-run counterparts (Sundaresan (1997, pp.16-18) ). Such difference in yields can never exist in perfect capital markets. The difference in the associated trading volumes is also hard to understand in any asset pricing theory that assumes perfect financial markets.
In this paper, we develop a model which is motivated by the on-the-run puzzle, and in which similar assets can have different price, volume, and liquidity. Our model is searchtheoretic, in that buyers and sellers meet through a search process, rather than in a centralized exchange. Once buyers enter the economy, they can invest in one of two identical assets. The markets for the assets are partially segmented: buyers can search in only one market, but can decide which one. Buyers' valuation can randomly switch to a low value, in which case buyers turn into sellers (if they have bought the asset in the meanwhile), or simply exit the economy. The switching rate is a measure of buyers' investment horizon, and differs across buyers. We use our model to examine two questions. First, can liquidity be concentrated in the market of one asset, even if the two assets are identical? Second, is such a concentration of liquidity desirable from a welfare viewpoint? To answer the first question, we determine the equilibria of our economy. We show that there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria where investors are indifferent between the two markets, and a unique clientele equilibrium where short-horizon investors strictly prefer one market. This market has higher volume and prices, and lower search times for buyers and sellers. Thus, this market is more liquid, and in this sense the clientele equilibrium corresponds to a concentration in liquidity.
To answer the second question, we compare the welfare under the clientele equilibrium to that under the symmetric equilibria. We show that the clientele equilibrium generally dominates the symmetric ones, i.e., the benefit of higher liquidity in one market exceeds the cost of lower liquidity in the other. However, in some cases the clientele equilibrium is dominated. We show that in those cases the entry of buyers in the liquid market is below the socially optimal level.
Our model extends the search-based approach to asset markets, pioneered by Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2001) , to the case of multiple markets and heterogenous investors.
Our first contribution is to capture in a single model many phenomena associated to liquidity.
These are: (i) liquid assets trade at a premium relative to less liquid assets; (ii) liquid assets have a higher turnover relative to less liquid assets; and (iii) liquidity and turnover can be very different for otherwise similar assets. All these phenomena seem to be true in the context of the on-the-run puzzle. Our second contribution is to examine whether the concentration of liquidity is desirable from a welfare viewpoint. In the context of the on-the-run puzzle, this amounts to asking whether the high liquidity in the on-the-run market, while being desirable when viewed in isolation, comes at a cost for other less liquid markets. Our welfare analysis raises, in fact, several interesting policy questions. Should, for example, illiquid markets be subsidized and liquid markets be taxed? Should market makers be provided with incentives to enter in illiquid markets?
Our search-based approach to liquidity should be contrasted with the traditional approach based on asymmetric information (e.g., Kyle (1985 Kyle ( , 1989 , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) ). Asymmetric information models can readily generate low turnover for less liquid assets, i.e., phenomenon (ii), and endogenous concentration of liquidity, i.e., phenomenon (iii).
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Most asymmetric information models, however, do not generate liquidity premia, i.e., phenomenon (i), because they assume risk-neutral market makers who set prices equal to assets' expected payoffs. While some asymmetric information models can generate liquidity premia (e.g. Wang (1993 Wang ( , 1994 , Garleanu and Pedersen (2001) ), an advantage of our search-based approach is that we can obtain phenomena (i)-(iii) in a simple and tractable model. Also, while asymmetric information is relevant for the 1 Regarding (ii), see for example, Glosten and Milgrom, who show that markets can shut down if informational asymmetries are severe enough. Regarding (iii), see for example, Admati and Pfleiderer for a model where concentration of liquidity occurs across time periods, and Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) for a model where it occurs across different markets. In Admati and Pfleiderer, uninformed traders prefer to trade in periods when a market is more liquid, and this is precisely what makes the market more liquid in these periods.
markets of many stocks, it is less relevant for the government bond market.
A more recent literature takes liquidity (measured by transaction costs) as exogenous, and determines its impact on asset prices (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , Constantinides (1986), Vayanos (1998) ). These models can readily generate liquidity premia and low turnover for less liquid assets, i.e., phenomena (i) and (ii). However, since in these models transaction costs are exogenous, two identical assets must have the same liquidity, and thus phenomenon (iii) cannot occur.
While much research has focused on the determination of liquidity and its impact on asset prices, comparatively less attention has been paid to the welfare analysis of the concentration of liquidity. Pagano (1989) assumes that a single asset can be traded in two segmented markets. He shows that the two markets can co-exist, but the resulting outcome is dominated by consolidating all trade (and all liquidity) in one market.
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Our work differs in that, as in the case of on-the-run and off-the-run bond markets, each market has to be "open" since each asset is in positive supply.
Finally, this paper is closely related to independent work by Weill (2002) , who also studies a search-based model with segmented markets. In Weill's model, however, investors are homogeneous, and this precludes multiple equilibria and the associated welfare analysis.
The differences in asset liquidity in Weill arise because of differences in assets' supplies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives the equilibria of the economy. Section 4 conducts the welfare analysis. Section 5 considers two possible extensions of the model: different asset supplies, and private information about the buyers' investment horizons. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
Model

The Setting
We adopt a continuous-time framework. Time goes from −∞ to ∞. There are two assets, 1 and 2, traded in markets 1 and 2, respectively. Both of the assets pay a constant flow δ of dividends and are both in supply S. Allowing the supplies to differ introduces some interesting effects. We will consider this extension in Section 5.1.
Investors are risk-neutral and have a discount rate equal to r. They can hold either zero or one unit of an asset and can decide whether it is asset 1 or 2. If the investor is a buyer, he can decide which market to enter to purchase the asset. If the investor is a seller, however, he can only sell the asset in the market where he bought it earlier. Since the two assets have exactly the same payoffs, the only relevant decision for a buyer is which market to enter. To introduce a re-trade motive for the investors after they purchased an asset, we assume that some investors, according to a mechanism to be described shortly, enjoy only a value δ − x of the dividend δ, where x > 0, while other investors enjoy the full value δ.
There is a constant flow f of investors with a valuation δ coming to the markets. They do not hold any of two assets initially and they each seek to buy one of the two assets. Before they enter into the markets, each of them has to decide which market to enter. After that, they search in the market for a seller to make a trade. The valuation of the assets by the investor can, however, switch to δ − x, at a rate κ. If by the switching time, the investor has not bought the asset, he simply exits the market. If instead he has bought the asset, he seeks to sell it, according to the search process, and then exits the market. Investors exiting the markets never enter it again.
The switching rate κ captures investors' horizons: for κ large, horizons are small, and vice-versa. It can also arise from differential taxation, or it can be a reduced form for a liquidity shock. We assume that investors are heterogeneous in their horizons. To describe this heterogeneity, we introduce a functionf (κ), such that the flow of investors who enter into the market with switching rates between κ and κ + dκ isf (κ)dκ. Denoting by [κ, κ] the support off (κ), we have κ κf (κ)dκ = f . We will assume throughout the paper, unless otherwise stated, that κ <κ.
We have assumed that upon arriving at the markets, each investor has to decide which of the two markets to enter, and he then restricts his search to the asset in this market. This assumption is crucial: if investors could search for both assets, the two assets would have an identical set of prospective buyers, and would trade at the same price. One interpretation for this assumption is that each investor has to or find it efficient to trade through one broker and brokers specialize in different assets. Alternatively, if different assets are held by different clienteles of investors (as is the case in some of our equilibria), and clientele characteristics are observable, investors might prefer to focus their search on one clientele.
We refer to the investors who are seeking to buy an asset as "high-type non-owners," since they have the high valuation δ and do not own the asset. Similarly, we refer to the investors who own an asset and do not seek to sell it as "high-type owners," since they have the high valuation δ and own the asset. We refer to the investors who are seeking to sell an asset as "low-type owners," since they have the low valuation δ − x and own the asset.
We should note that there are also "low-type non-owners." These are the investors who have
either not yet entered the market, or already exited the market.
Summarizing, we can describe the two markets by the flow diagram in Figure 1 . Each market has three groups of investors that belong to that market exclusively. The first two groups are the high-and low-type owners. These are the owners of the asset of that market.
The third group is the high-type non-owners. These are the investors who have chosen to enter that market, but have not yet been able to acquire the asset. The fourth group of investors, the low-type non-owners, do not belong to any particular market. This is the pool of investors from which the flow f of new potential buyers come and to which those who left market 1 or 2 return.
The search process is characterized by the rate at which buyers in each market meet with sellers. We assume that any given buyer-seller pair can meet at a rate λ. Denote the measure of high-type non-owners in market i by µ To complete the description of the setting, we assume the price at which a trade occurs between a buyer and a seller is determined through bargaining. The bargaining game takes a very simple form. Either the buyer or the seller is randomly selected to make a take-it-orleave-it offer. If the offer is rejected, the two parties do not trade, and go back into the search process. The probability of the buyer making the offer is z/(1 + z), where the parameter z > 0 is exogenous, and measures the buyer's relative bargaining power.
Because buyers differ in their switching rates κ, they can place different values in owning the asset. This can complicate the bargaining problem because it can introduce asymmetric information. For simplicity, we first consider the symmetric information case, where a buyer's switching rate κ is observable to the seller. For example, κ can correspond to the buyer's observable institutional characteristics (e.g., insurance companies have a long horizon, while investment banks a shorter one). In the symmetric information case, all matches result in a trade, since it is more efficient for a high-type investor to own the asset. The asymmetric information case is considered in Section 5.2.
Demographics
In this section, we determine the steady-state investor populations. Specifically, for each market i, we determine the measures µ i hn of high-type non-owners, µ i ho of high-type owners, and µ i lo of low-type non-onwers. We do not make any assumption about investors' decisions on which market to enter. Rather, we take the investors' entry decision as given and consider the general case where the entry decision is collectively described by ν 
To determineμ i hn (κ), we consider the flows in and out of the population of high-type non-owners with switching rates between κ and κ + dκ. The inflow is simplyf (κ)ν Consequently, the density of high-type non-owners is given bŷ
It can be seen from this expression of the density that, given µ 
Combining this equation with equation (3), we find
Note that the distribution of the population of high-type owners has even thinner upper tail.
Market equilibrium requires that the measure of owners in each market be equal to the asset supply, that is,
Combining equations (2), (5), and (6), we have
Equation (7) 
Investors' Entry Decisions
Now we turn to each individual investors' utility maximization problem. Since each investor can only hold zero or one unit of asset, the problem for low-type owners, i.e., the sellers, is simply to search for a buyer and then make a trade when it is profitable.
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For the high-type non-owners, i.e., the buyers, since the two assets have exactly the same payoffs, the only relevant decision is which market to enter. After entry, they will simply search and then trade. We determine in this section the investors' expected utilities under each scenario given the population distribution described in Section 2.2. The expected utilities of hightype owners and non-owners depend on the switching rate κ, and we denote them by v i ho (κ) and v i hn (κ), respectively, for market i. The expected utility of low-type non-owners does not depend on κ, since switching has already taken place, and we denote it by v i lo . We normalize to zero the expected utility of an agent who has exited the market.
As described in Section 2.1, the price at which a trade between a buyer and a seller occurs is the result of a bargaining process. With probability the buyer makes an offer and with probability 1/(1 + z) the seller makes an offer. We will denote by p i (κ) the expected price resulting from a meeting where the buyer has switching rate κ.
Consider first the expected utility v i hn (κ) of a high-type non-owner with switching rate κ. In a small time inverval dt, this investor can either switch to a low-type non-owner or become a high-type owner through successful search. The first event has probability κdt and the investor's utility becomes zero, while the second event has probability 2λµ 
The investor will enter market 1 if and only if v
hn (κ), and vise versa.
Consider next the expected utility v i ho (κ) of a high-type owner with switching rate κ. This investor receives the cash flow δ from holding the asset, and can switch to a low-type owner. The switching occurs with probability κdt in which case the investor's utility becomes
Consider finally the expected utility v i lo of a low-type owner. Since this investor enjoys a lower cash flow δ − x from holding the asset, he is better off selling the asset to an investor who has a higher valuation of the asset. A successful search and trade occurs with probability 2λµ i hn dt. The price at which the trade is made depends on the buyer he meets. Thus the investor's expected utility conditional on a successful search is
denotes the expectation under the probability distribution of κ in the buyer population. As will be seen in Section 2.4,
lo is always strictly positive. Therefore,
Prices
To determine the resulting price of the bargaining game, we note that if the buyer gets to make the take-it-or-leave-it offer, his offer will be v i lo , while if the seller gets to make the offer, it will be v
Proposition 1 Given µ i hn and µ i lo , the system of (8)- (11) has a unique solution. In particular,
Equilibrium
The expected utilities and prices derived in Section 2.3 depend on the measures µ i hn and µ i lo of buyers and sellers. These measures depend, in turn, on investors' collective entry decisions, in a way derived in Section 2.2. Finally, entry decisions depend on the expected utilities of being in each market. In this section, we solve for the collective entry decisions and, combining our results with those of the previous sections, we determine the full market equilibrium.
Investors enter into a market as high-type non-owners. They will prefer the market where the expected utility of being a high-type non-owner is greatest. The fraction ν 1 (κ) of investors with switching rate κ, who enter into market 1, is thus given by (1)- (5), and (7). (14)- (16) , and ν
Definition 1 A market equilibrium consists of fractions {ν
In equilibrium, investors must be entering into both markets. Therefore, by continuity, there must exist an investor who is indifferent between the two markets, i.e., a κ * such that
. In Lemma 2, we examine whether other investors can also be indifferent.
According to Lemma Lemma 2 sharply restricts the set of possible equilibria. Equilibria can take one of two forms. First, there can be more sellers in one market than in the other, in which case the market with the most sellers attracts the investors with the high switching rates. We refer to these equilibria as clientele equilibria, to emphasize that each market attracts a different clientele of investors. Second, there can be equal measures of sellers in the two markets, in which case all investors are indifferent between the two markets. We refer to these equilibria as symmetric equilibria, to emphasize that markets are symmetric from the viewpoint of all investors.
Symmetric Equilibria
We consider first the symmetric equilibria. In a symmetric equilibrium, all investors are indifferent between the two markets. Such indifference holds under two conditions. The first condition, as shown in Lemma 2, is that there are equal measures of sellers in the two markets, i.e., µ
which follows from setting µ
Combining equations (13) and (17), we find that the price that a given buyer can get in the two markets is the same, i.e.,
Since there is a continuum of possible allocations of investors between the two markets characterized by the function ν 1 (κ) and these allocations are subject only to the two conditions described above, there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria. One trivial example is the "perfectly" symmetric equilibrium, where for any switching rate, half of the investors go to each market (i.e., ν
Interestingly, for any equilibrium in the continuum, the common measure µ lo of sellers in the two markets is the same. Indeed, adding equation (7) for market 1 to the same equation for market 2, and setting µ
This equation determines µ lo uniquely, regardless of the specific allocation of investors in the two markets.
Clientele Equilibria
For clientele equilibria, we focus on the one where market 1 has more sellers. Since assets 1 and 2 are symmetric, any equilibrium obtained in this case has a counterpart in which there are more sellers in market 2.
A clientele equilibrium is characterized by the switching rate κ * of the investor who is indifferent between the two markets. Given κ * , the measures of sellers in the two markets are obtained by equation (7). For market 1, we set ν 1 (κ) = 0 for κ < κ * , and ν
, and find
For market 2, we similarly find 1 + 2λµ
In Theorem 4, we show that equation (21) determines κ * uniquely, and moreover, for this
lo . This implies that a clientele equilibrium exists and is unique. From now on, we denote the equilibrium value of κ * by κ * e , to distinguish it from the value of κ * corresponding to the social optimum that will be discussed in Section 4.
Theorem 4 There exists a unique clientele equilibrium in which µ
It is important to understand why a clientele equilibrium may exist. It boils down to why different investors may prefer different markets and how this preference may work in a self reinforcing way to actually create the clientele equilibrium. Intuitively, when µ 1 lo > µ 2 lo , the advantage of market 1 over market 2 from a buyer's viewpoint is that there is a larger number of sellers and thus a higher probability of meeting a seller. Other things being equal, all buyers should prefer to go to market 1. As more buyers go to market 1, µ 1 hn increases and µ 1 lo decreases. Then the price in market 1 rises. Symmetrically, the price in market 2 decreases. Thus, when entering market 1, an investor trades off a higher probability of meeting a seller, with a higher price. Investors with high switching rates place a greater value in transacting quickly because, if he cannot find a partner to trade before his type changes, his utility becomes zero. Investors with low switching rates, however, have less urgency to trade. For them the trade-off between probability of meeting a seller and the price tilts more in favor of getting a cheaper price. Note that investors do not have to separate themselves in this. As shown in Section 3.1, a perfectly symmetric equilibrium can exists. However, once investors start the self-selection process, the clientele equilibrium will emerge. In such equilibrium, investors with high switching rate end up in market 1 and investors with low switching probability in market 2.
Lemma 2 and Theorem 4 confirm one half of the intuition described above. In Proposition 5, we confirm the second half of the intuition regarding prices and the size of investor population. We show that the price that any given buyer can get in market 1 exceeds the price that he can get in market 2. We also show that the ratio of buyers to sellers in market 1 exceeds that in market 2. In particular, there are more buyers in market 1.
Proposition 5 In the clientele equilibrium where µ
1 lo > µ 2 lo , (a) p 1 (κ) > p 2 (κ) for all κ. (b) µ 1 hn /µ 1 lo > µ 2 hn /µ 2 lo .
Trading Volume, Liquidity and Prices
As described in the introduction, one of the main motivations of this paper is to understand why there is such significant difference between the on-and off-the-run bond markets in terms of prices and trading volumes. In both the investment industry and the academic literature, the pricing difference has been termed as liquidity premium and the difference in trading volumes has been cited as evidence of difference in the liquidity of the two markets.
In this section, we study in our model, more specifically in the clientele equilibrium, how prices, trading volumes and liquidities of the two markets are related.
We begin with introducing measures of volume and liquidity in our model. Since each successful search leads to a trade and the probability of a successful search per unit of time is 2λµ By liquidity we mean the speed at which a buyer and a seller can find each other and trade. 4 One way to measure the speed is by the length of the time interval between consecutive trades. The shorter the interval, the higher the liquidity. Volume per unit of time has been informally used as an indicator of liquidity in the financial industry. As will be seen, it is closely tied to the liquidity measures we use. For liquidity, we introduce the following three measures. 
Welfare Analysis
In this section, we study the welfare properties of the equilibrium allocations in both the symmetric equilibria and the clientele equilibria. We consider both the welfare of the investors present in the market at a given point in time, and that of the future entrants. To construct a social welfare function, we give the utilities of all investors present in the market equal weight and discount those of the future entrants at the common discount rate r. This discounting is consistent with equal weighting if future entrants are interpreted as investors who are "present" in the economy, but are currently out of the market, because, say, they have the low valuation δ − x. Our social welfare function thus is
where the last term reflects the welfare of the stream of future entrants. In Lemma 7, we show that the social welfare function takes a very simple and intuitive form.
The first term in equation (23) is simply the present value of the dividends paid by the two assets. The social welfare function would coincide with this present value, if all asset owners enjoyed the full value δ of the dividends. Some owners, however, enjoy only the value δ − x. These are the sellers in the two markets, and the social welfare function needs to be adjusted downwards by their total measure.
A useful benchmark for our analysis is the allocation chosen by a social planner, who can decide which investors enter in each market, but cannot interfere with the search process.
Formally, the social planner can choose the fraction ν 1 (κ) of investors with switching rate κ who enter into market 1. He is, however, subject to the constraint that the measure of sellers in each market is determined through the search process, by equation (7). Thus, the social planner's problem is 
The second solution is obtained from the first by switching the indices of the two assets. lo . In order to do that, the social planner has to maximize trading opportunities for buyers and sellers. This means for buyers with higher switching rate, the social planner should put them in a market with a larger population of sellers so that they have a better chance to trade before their type changes. For buyers with lower switching rates, since they have less chance to leave market due to change of type, he can put them in a market with fewer sellers. Mixing buyers of different switching rates in both markets, as is the case in any symmetric equilibrium, makes it impossible for the social planner to use the above strategy to maximize trading opportunities for buyers and sellers.
Thus the allocation in any symmetric equilibrium cannot be efficient.
By the same reason, even if an allocation separates buyers with different switching rates into different markets according to a trigger level, as long as it does not allocate more sellers in the market with high switching rate buyers, the allocation is not efficient because it does not create the greatest trading opportunities for buyers and sellers in the society as a whole.
Having determined the socially optimal allocation, we next examine the welfare properties of the equilibrium allocations. We ask two questions. First, how does the welfare under the clientele equilibrium compare to that under the symmetric equilibrium? Second, how does the cutoff κ * e corresponding to the clientele equilibrium compare to the socially optimal cutoff κ * w ? The two questions are, in fact, related as described in the following proposition. 
Extension and Variant of the Basic Model
In this section we will consider one extension and one variant of the model studied so far.
The extension generalizes the basic model to allow for different supplies in the two markets.
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The variant allows for asymmetric information between buyers and sellers.
The Model with Different Supplies
We will consider the case that S 1 > S 2 . All results in Section 2 remain true except that equation (7) needs to be replaced by
The major difference is in the set of equilibria. There are still multiple equilibria. One set of equilibria are symmetric equilibria. We will be mostly interested in the clientele equilibria.
When there is difference in supply, the two clientele equilibria are no longer symmetric. We will focus on the clientele equilibrium where market 1 has more sellers than market 2. The main results are summarized in the following propositions. The following proposition would not come as a surprise either given the intuition described following Proposition 6.
Proposition 12 In the clientele equilibrium, (a) V
There is, however, an interesting case that highlights an economic factor that would not exists in the basic model. This is the case of homogenous investors. That is κ =κ = κ. In In a homogeneous investor economy, as long as there is any difference in liquidity across the two markets, buyers will still choose to go to the market with higher liquidity, other things being equal. To attract the buyers, sellers in the other market, say market 2, have to lower their price of the asset. So there is the same liquidity-price tradeoff for buyers. The difference between a homogeneous investor economy and a heterogeneous investor one lies in what gives rise to the possible difference in liquidity. In a homogeneous investor economy it is induced by the difference in supplies of assets. If the liquidity of the two market were to be the same, then inflow of buyers would split half and half for each market. But then there would be more sellers left in market 1 because of the higher supply in that market, which would then cause the liquidity of that market to rise. Therefore, for equilibrium to emerge, the liquidity in market 1 has to be higher than that in market 2. This difference in supply is the additional factor for inducing difference in liquidity which would not exist in an economy with equal supplies. The homogeneous investor economy abstracts from the other factor, the investor heterogeneity in investment horizon or liquidity need, and highlights the difference-in-supply factor.
The welfare analysis for the case of different supply is also essentially the same as the case of equal supply, except that, due to the lack of symmetry in supply, the social planner's problem has only one solution, in which investors with high switching rates are allocated to market 1. 
Asymmetric Information (Preliminary)
In this section we study a variant of the basic model. We assume now that sellers do not know buyers' type. The demographics of investors still satisfies the same equations as in the basic model. The pricing setting bargaining game will be different due to the asymmetry in information.
The utility functions of the agents are given by
where
The prices p 
We still consider a one period bargaining game in which with probability z/(1 + z) the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, and with probability 1/(1 + z) the seller makes a takeit-or-leave-it offer. We employ the simplest bargaining game under asymmetric information.
If the buyer gets to make the offer, his price-setting problem is
Here hn (κ) = 0 in market 1. However, since a buyer's utility is decreasing in κ because lower switch rate implies a higher probability of becoming a owner, the investor whose switching rate is just above κ * must have a gain from trade strictly greater than zero because he is in market 1.
But then the investor with switching rate κ * is better off if he goes to market 1. Therefore the clientele equilibrium cannot exist. Our numerical example also shows that even when z is large, a clientele equilibrium may fail to exist. However, when a clientele equilibrium does exist, it has the following properties. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a search-based model of asset trading. In our model, investors differ in their horizons, and can invest in two identical assets. The asset markets are partially segmented: investors can search in only one market, but can decide which one. We show that there exist a continuum of symmetric equilibria where investors are indifferent between the two markets, and a unique clientele equilibrium where short-horizon investors strictly prefer one market. This "liquid" market has higher volume and prices, and lower search times for buyers and sellers. The clientele equilibrium generally dominates the symmetric ones, i.e., the concentration of liquidity is socially desirable. In some cases, however, the clientele equilibrium is dominated, and in these cases the entry of buyers in the liquid market is below the socially optimal level.
Our analysis, while still preliminary, can have interesting practical implications. It can contribute to the understanding of the on-the-run puzzle. It can also contribute to the policy question of whether trading in illiquid markets should be subsidized (by encouraging market maker entry, for example) at the expense of trading in more liquid markets.
Proof to Proposition 1: Plugging p i (κ) from equation (11) to equations (8) and (10) 
and
Subtracting equation (33) from equation (9), we find
Equations (35) and (34) imply that
and equations (36) and (35) imply that
To determine v i hn (κ), we note that equations (35) and (33) imply that
Plugging v i lo from equation (36) to equation (38), we find equation (12) . Finally, equation (13) follows by plugging equations (36) and (37) into equation (11) .
hn (κ) has the same sign as
, which proves the lemma.
Proof to Lemma 3:
The LHS of equation (19) is strictly increasing in µ 
Similarly, given κ * , equation (20) 
Proof to Theorem 4: We first rearrange equation (21) into a more convenient form. The conditional expectation for market 1 is given by
where the second equality follows from equation (3) . Similarly, for market 2, we have
Using the above equations to replace the conditional expectations in equation (21), and multiplying by the denominators, we find
To prove the proposition, we consider equation (39) (κ + 2λµ
Similarly,
Combining equations (40) and (41) with equation (39), we find
Combining this equation with equations (19) and (20), we find
Since the term in brackets is positive, we have µ
To show that the equilibrium is unique, it suffices to show that for any κ * that solves equation (39), the derivative of the LHS w.r.t. κ * is strictly positive. Denoting the LHS by
We will show that the partial derivatives w.r.t. κ * and µ 
which implies claim (b).
Proof to Lemma 7: Consider the term that corresponds to market i. Using equations (8)- (10), we can write this term as
The coefficient of δ is
where the first equality follows from equation (2) and the second from equation (6) . The
and is zero from equation ( . We will show that this constrained problem, (P c ), has a unique solution, which coincides with the first solution in the proposition. We will next show that this solution, together with the symmetric solution obtained by switching the indices of the two assets, are the only solutions to the unconstrained problem, (P).
Lemma 3 implies that the derivative of µ
Multiplying by the denominators, we find that the term in brackets has the same sign as To show that the solution to (P c ), together with its symmetric solution, are the only solutions to (P), we proceed by contradiction, and assume that there is a third allocation 
and consider the corresponding trigger allocation. From the definition of κ , the measure µ 2 lo of sellers in market 2 under the allocation ν 1 (κ), solves also equation (7) under the new allocation. Therefore, this measure is the same under both allocations. We next show that
and that the inequality is strict if µ 
Equation (44) implies that
Equation (46), together with the fact that ν 1 (κ) gives non-zero weight to values below κ (since it is not a trigger allocation), and the fact that the function 1/(κ + 2λµ
Multiplying equation (47) 
and similarly
Combining equations (48) and (49) with equation (39), which holds for κ * = κ * e , we find 
respectively, and φ(κ) ≡f (κ)/f . Similarly, equation (18) implies that the common measure µ lo of sellers in the symmetric equilibrium is asymptotically of the form χ/f , where χ is given by
Equations (51)- (53) imply that
To show that W c < W s , we proceed by contradiction and assume that
Equations (51), (52), and (54), imply that
Moreover, equation (54) implies that
Finally, taking the limit of equation (39) as f goes to infinity, we find
Equations (55)- (57) (κ + 2λµ
Combining equations (59) and (60) with equation (39), we find
Combining this equation with equation (25), we find
Since the term in brackets is positive, we have µ 
where ν i are the fraction of the flow of high-type non-owners going into market i.. Equation .
Now we claim that the numerator of the left side is always greater than that of the right side. To see it, note first that κ(1 + z) + z(r + 2λµ 
